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THERRIEN, OCEAN PORT AND 
THE DOCTRINES OF JUDICIAL 
AND TRIBUNAL INDEPENDENCE 
The Honourable Justice Robert J. Sharpe* 
Shirley Margolis** 
Since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 the 
Supreme Court of Canada has increasingly been called upon to address the 
meaning and scope of judicial independence and tribunal independence in 
Canada. In Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of 
Prince Edward Island,2 the  
Supreme Court reached a high-water mark in the expansion of the doctrine of 
judicial independence by holding that judicial independence is an unwritten 
constitutional principle. 
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada released two decisions with signifi-
cant implications for the unwritten constitutional principle articulated in the 
Provincial Court Judges Reference: Therrien (Re)3 and Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. 
v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing 
Branch).4 In Therrien, the Supreme Court held that the unwritten constitutional 
principle did not require an address of the legislature to remove a provincial 
court judge from office. In Ocean Port, the Supreme Court held that the un-
written constitutional principle does not apply to administrative tribunals. Both 
decisions represent a considerable receding from the high-water mark reached 
in the Provincial Court Judges Reference.  
The purpose of this paper is to consider the implications of the  
Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Therrien and Ocean Port. The paper 
will comprise three sections: the past doctrines, the recent decisions, and the 
future debates. The first section will describe the doctrine of judicial independ-
ence and the doctrine of tribunal independence developed by the Supreme 
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1
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the Charter]. 
2
  (sub nom. Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court 
of Prince Edward Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial 
Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice)), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter the Provincial Court 
Judges Reference]. 
3
  [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Therrien]. 
4
  [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781 [hereinafter Ocean Port]. 
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Court of Canada prior to  
Therrien and Ocean Port. The second section will outline the decisions in 
Therrien and Ocean Port. The third section will examine the debates left open 
by these decisions. Together, these sections aim to situate the decisions in 
Therrien and Ocean Port in their historical and jurisprudential context and to 
consider the future development of the doctrines of judicial independence and 
tribunal independence.  
I.  THE PAST DOCTRINES 
The doctrines of judicial independence and tribunal independence aim to en-
sure that decision-making is both independent and perceived to be independent. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently affirmed the importance of both 
doctrines. In Beauregard v. Canada,5 the Supreme Court held that judicial 
independence is  
“essential for fair and just dispute-resolution” and is also “the lifeblood of 
constitutionalism in democratic societies”.6 In Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui 
Indian Band,7 the Supreme Court recognized tribunal independence as a princi-
ple of natural justice:  
[I]t is a principle of natural justice that a party should receive a hearing before a tri-
bunal which is not only independent, but also appears independent. Where a party 
has a reasonable apprehension of bias, it should not be required to submit to the tri-
bunal giving rise to this apprehension.8 
While these decisions affirm the importance of the doctrines of judicial in-
dependence and tribunal independence, they also suggest that these two doc-
trines have distinct sources. Judicial independence is linked to the constitution. 
Tribunal independence is linked to the common law principle of natural justice. 
The following section of the paper considers the distinct sources of judicial 
independence and tribunal independence and the way these distinct sources 
affected the scope of each doctrine prior to Therrien and Ocean Port. The 
doctrine of judicial independence is outlined first, followed by the doctrine of 
tribunal independence. 
                                                                                                                                                              
5
  [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 [hereinafter Beauregard]. 
6
  Id., at 70. 
7
  [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Matsqui]. 
8
  Id., at 49. 
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1. Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence is a constitutional principle whose sources are both 
written and unwritten. Over the past two decades, the sources of this constitu-
tional principle have expanded from the quasi-constitutional Canadian Bill of 
Rights9 and Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,10 to the Constitu-
tion Act, 186711 and the Charter and finally to the unwritten constitutional 
principle articulated in the Provincial Court Judges Reference.  
The quasi-constitutional Canadian Bill of Rights and Quebec Charter pro-
tected judicial independence prior to the Charter and continue to protect judicial 
independence today. Subsection 2(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights provides 
that the laws of Canada should not be construed so as to “deprive a person 
charged with a criminal offence of the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal.” Subsection 2(e) provides that the laws of Canada 
should not be construed so as to “deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination 
of his rights and obligations.” Section 23 of the Quebec Charter provides that 
every citizen has a right to a “full and equal, public and fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, for the determination of his rights and 
obligations or of the merits of any charge. . . .” 
The judicature provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 protect the judicial 
independence of superior court judges, though not the  
judicial independence of provincial court judges. Section 96 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 provides that the Governor General shall appoint superior court 
judges. Subsection 99(1) provides that superior court judges shall hold office 
during good behaviour and shall only be removable by the Governor General 
on address of the Senate and House of Commons. Section 100 provides that the 
salaries,  
allowances and pensions of superior court judges shall be fixed and provided 
by the Parliament of Canada.  
Since the enactment of the Charter, subsection 11(d) has protected the judi-
cial independence of all judges exercising criminal jurisdiction. Under subsec-
tion 11(d), any person charged with an offence has the right “to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal”. Although section 7 of the Charter may also 
                                                                                                                                                              
9
  S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III [hereinafter the Canadian Bill of 
Rights]. 
10
  R.S.Q., c. C-12 [hereinafter the Quebec Charter]. 
11
  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter the Con-
stitution Act, 1867]. 
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guarantee judicial independence under the principles of fundamental justice, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has focused on the requirements for judicial inde-
pendence under subsection 11(d).12  
Together, subsection 11(d) of the Charter and the judicature provisions of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 provide important written constitutional sources of 
judicial independence. In the Provincial Court Judges Reference, the Supreme 
Court of Canada found that judicial independence also has an important unwrit-
ten constitutional source. The Provincial Court Judges Reference concerned the 
financial security of provincial court judges. The Supreme Court held that the 
express provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Charter are not an 
exhaustive code for the protection of judicial independence in Canada.13 Rather, 
these specific provisions are elaborations of a broader unwritten, underlying, 
organizing principle implicit in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, 
which provides that Canada desires to have “a Constitution similar in principle 
to that of the United Kingdom.”14 The Supreme Court held that the preamble of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 recognizes and affirms judicial independence as an 
unwritten constitutional principle:  
Judicial independence is an unwritten norm, recognized and affirmed by the pre-
amble to the Constitution Act, 1867. In fact, it is in that preamble, which serves as 
the grand entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution, that the true source of our 
commitment to this foundational principle is located.15 
In the Provincial Court Judges Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada ap-
plied the unwritten constitutional principle of judicial independence to the 
financial security of provincial court judges to find that before provincial gov-
ernments may alter the financial  
remuneration of provincial court judges, the governments must establish objec-
tive, independent judicial compensation commissions to make recommenda-
tions. Although the Supreme Court applied the unwritten constitutional 
principle to the financial security of provincial court judges, the Supreme Court 
did not limit the application of the principle to this element of judicial inde-
pendence. On the  
contrary, the breadth of the unwritten constitutional principle articulated in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
12
  In R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, the Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 7 did not 
provide a more comprehensive protection of judicial independence than s. 11(d) in that case. Since 
the accused’s challenge fell squarely within s. 11(d), the more open language of s. 7 did not 
strengthen the accused’s argument.  
13
  Supra, note 2, at 77. 
14
  Id., at 69-78. 
15
  Id., at 77-78. 
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Provincial Court Judges Reference suggested that the principle could apply 
equally to other elements of judicial independence.  
These written and unwritten constitutional sources of judicial  
independence have given rise to a broad doctrine of judicial independence. In 
Beauregard and Valente v. R.,16 the Supreme Court of Canada outlined four 
elements of judicial independence: adjudicative independence, security of 
tenure, financial security and administrative control over proceedings. Each of 
these elements will be considered in turn.  
Adjudicative independence requires that the judicial decision-making proc-
ess be free from interference by the legislature, the executive, pressure groups 
and other judges. In Beauregard, the Supreme Court of Canada held:  
Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence 
has been the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that 
come before them: no outsider — be it government, pressure group, individual or 
even another judge — should interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way 
in which a judge conducts his or her case and makes his or her decision. This core 
continues to be central to the principle of judicial independence.17 
The requirement that the judicial decision-making process be free from inter-
ference is so central to judicial independence that judges have been given tes-
timonial immunity with respect to their decision-making process. In 
MacKeigan v. Hickman,18 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the judges of 
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal who had overturned Donald Marshall’s con-
viction could not be compelled to testify about their decision-making process 
before the executive, the legislature, the Royal Commission appointed by the 
executive, or a judge in a civil suit. 
Security of tenure has both institutional and individual dimensions. In its in-
stitutional dimension, security of tenure protects courts against modification or 
abolition by the legislature. In its individual dimension, security of tenure 
protects judges against removal from office. Section 99 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 ensures that superior court judges hold office during good behaviour and 
that their removal requires an address of the legislature. With respect to the 
removal of provincial court judges, the Supreme Court of Canada held in 
Valente that subsection 11(d) of the Charter does not require an address of the 
legislature but does require the following:  
...that the judge be removable only for cause, and that cause be subject to independ-
ent review and determination by a process at which the judge affected is afforded a 
                                                                                                                                                              
16
  [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 [hereinafter Valente]. 
17
  Supra, note 5, at 69. 
18
  [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796. 
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full opportunity to be heard. The essence of security of tenure for purposes of s. 
11(d) is a tenure, whether until an age of retirement, for a fixed term, or for a spe-
cific adjudicative task, that is secure against interference by the Executive or other 
appointing authority in a discretionary or arbitrary manner.19  
Financial security protects against interference with the financial remunera-
tion of judges. In Valente, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a judge’s 
right to salary must be established by law and that the executive may not inter-
fere with the right to salary in a manner that affects the independence of the 
judge. Further, as noted above, in the Provincial Court Judges Reference, the 
Supreme Court held that before provincial governments may alter the judicial 
remuneration of provincial court judges, they must establish independent, 
objective judicial compensation commissions to make recommendations. The 
commissions must convene and report on a regular basis. Although their rec-
ommendations are not binding, governments must justify any departure from 
the recommendations on a standard of rationality.  
Finally, administrative control over proceedings protects against interference 
with “administrative decisions that bear directly and immediately on the exer-
cise of the judicial function” such as the “assignment of judges, sittings of the 
court and court lists” as well as “matters of allocation of court rooms and direc-
tions of the administrative staff engaged in carrying out these functions.”20  
Together, the four elements of judicial independence — adjudicative inde-
pendence, security of tenure, financial security and administrative control over 
proceedings — comprise the doctrine of judicial independence developed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada prior to Therrien and Ocean Port. In comparison 
to the doctrine of judicial independence, the doctrine of tribunal independence 
has been more limited both in its sources and in its scope.  
2. Tribunal Independence  
While the sources of judicial independence are constitutional, the primary 
source of tribunal independence is the common law principle of natural justice. 
To be sure, the sources of tribunal independence are not entirely limited to the 
common law. The constitutive statutes of some administrative tribunals provide 
guarantees of tribunal independence. For example, the Regulated Health Pro-
fessions Act, 199121 prohibits an individual from being a panel member of a 
discipline committee where the individual has taken part in the investigation of 
the subject matter of the hearing. Furthermore, the quasi-constitutional Cana-
                                                                                                                                                              
19
  Supra, note 16, at 698. 
20
  Id., at 709, 712. 
21
  S.O. 1991, c. 18, Sch. 2, s. 38(4). 
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dian Bill of Rights and Quebec Charter apply to administrative tribunals. In 
2747-3174 Québec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool),22 the Supreme 
Court of Canada found that the institutional structure of the Régie des permis 
d’alcool did not meet the requirements of section 23 of the Quebec Charter 
because employees of the Régie were authorized to participate at each stage of 
the process leading to the cancellation of a liquor permit, from investigation to 
adjudication.  
However, the constitutive statutes of many administrative tribunals do not 
provide explicit guarantees of tribunal independence. Moreover, although 
tribunal independence has quasi-constitutional written protection, the doctrine 
has no constitutional written protection. Neither the Constitution Act, 1867 nor 
the Charter provides guarantees of tribunal independence. For these reasons, it 
is clear that the written sources of tribunal independence are more limited than 
the written sources of judicial independence. What was unclear after the Pro-
vincial Court Judges Reference and before Therrien and Ocean Port was 
whether the unwritten constitutional principle of judicial independence articu-
lated in the Provincial Court Judges Reference extended to administrative 
tribunals.  
In Matsqui, the Supreme Court held that “the principles of judicial independ-
ence outlined in Valente are applicable in the case of an administrative tribunal, 
where the tribunal is functioning as an adjudicative body settling disputes and 
determining the rights of parties.”23 However, the Supreme Court also held that 
“a strict application of these principles is not always warranted.”24 Moreover, as 
the following discussion suggests, the four elements outlined in Beauregard 
and Valente — adjudicative independence, security of tenure, financial security 
and administrative control over proceedings — have had a narrower scope in 
the context of tribunal independence than in the context of judicial independ-
ence.  
Adjudicative independence has had a narrower scope because the executive 
and the legislature may interfere with the decision-making process through 
policy directions, cabinet appeals and budgetary control,25 because the tribunal 
may influence the decision-making process of its members through full-board 
meetings or the review of draft reasons,26 and because, in some situations, 
tribunal members can be compelled to testify about their decision-making 
                                                                                                                                                              
22
  [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919 [hereinafter Régie]. 
23
  Supra, note 7, at 49. 
24
  Id. 
25
  Wyman, “The Independence of Administrative Tribunals in an Era of Ever Expansive Ju-
dicial Independence” (2001) 14 C.J.A.L.P. 61 at 107-8. 
26
  Id., at 104. 
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process during an application for judicial review.27 Security of tenure has had a 
narrower scope because tribunal members are commonly appointed on a part-
time, limited-term, at-pleasure basis, because there are restrictions on the reme-
dies for removal of tribunal members,28 and because the legislature may restruc-
ture tribunals. The fact that the legislature may restructure tribunals has also 
limited financial security and administrative control over proceedings.  
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the Provincial Court Judges 
Reference had the potential to expand the sources of tribunal independence and 
thereby expand the scope of the doctrine. In articulating the unwritten constitu-
tional principle, the majority of the Supreme Court did not restrict the principle 
to particular judges or courts. It was therefore arguable that the unwritten con-
stitutional principle could apply to administrative tribunals, or at least to admin-
istrative tribunals fulfilling quasi-judicial functions. As LaForest J. stated in 
dissent: 
The word “court” is a broad term and can encompass a wide variety of tribunals. In 
the province of Quebec, for example, the term is legislatively used in respect of any 
number of administrative tribunals. Are we to include only those inferior courts ap-
plying ordinary jurisdiction in civil matters, or should we include all sorts of ad-
ministrative tribunals, some of which are of far greater importance than ordinary 
civil courts? And if we do, is a distinction to be drawn between different tribunals 
and on the basis of what principles is this to be done? 29 
The application of the unwritten constitutional principle articulated in the 
Provincial Court Judges Reference was at issue in both Therrien and Ocean 
Port. Having outlined the doctrines of judicial independence and tribunal inde-
pendence developed by the Supreme Court of Canada prior to Therrien and 
Ocean Port, we proceed to consider the Supreme Court’s decisions in those 
cases.  
II.  THE RECENT DECISIONS 
In both Therrien and Ocean Port, the Supreme Court of Canada receded 
from the high-water mark reached in the Provincial Court Judges Reference. In 
Therrien, the Supreme Court acknowledged the application of the unwritten 
                                                                                                                                                              
27
  Id., at 106-7. In Québec (Commission des affaires socials) v. Tremblay, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 
952, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the lack of testimonial immunity for administrative 
tribunal members was justified because of the nature of judicial review and because of the need to 
prohibit tribunals from constraining their members. 
28
  See, e.g., Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 and Hewat v. Ontario (1998), 37 
O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.).  
29
  Supra, note 2, at 185. 
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constitutional principle to the financial security of provincial court judges but 
declined to apply the principle to require an address of the legislature prior to 
removing a provincial court judge from office. In Ocean Port, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged the application of the unwritten constitutional principle to 
judges but declined to apply the principle to administrative tribunal members.  
1. Therrien 
Therrien involved a constitutional challenge to the removal process of pro-
vincial court judges under section 95 of the Courts of Justice Act.30 Richard 
Therrien applied for judicial appointment on five occasions between 1989 and 
1998. On the final occasion, he failed to disclose to the selection committee the 
existence of convictions for which he had been pardoned. The selection com-
mittee gave Therrien a favourable recommendation and the Minister of Justice 
recommended that he be appointed as a judge of the Court of Quebec. When 
the Minister learned of his failure to disclose his convictions, he lodged a com-
plaint with the Quebec Conseil de la magistrature to determine whether Judge 
Therrien was “capable, in the circumstances, of fulfilling his role with dignity, 
honour and impartiality.”31  
The Conseil established a committee to consider the complaint and the 
committee found that the complaint was justified and recommended the re-
moval of Judge Therrien. Pursuant to the committee’s recommendation, the 
Conseil recommended that the Minister of Justice initiate the process to remove 
Judge Therrien by making a request to the Court of Appeal under section 95 of 
the Courts of Justice Act. Section 95 provides that “[t]he Government may 
remove a judge only upon a report of the Court of Appeal made after inquiry at 
the request of the Minister of Justice.” The Minister of Justice made the request 
and a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal conducted the inquiry. The Court 
of Appeal panel recommended that the Government revoke Judge Therrien’s 
commission.  
On eventual appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Therrien argued, inter 
alia, that section 95 of the Courts of Justice Act infringed the structural princi-
ple of judicial independence by permitting a provincial court judge to be re-
moved without an address of the legislature. In so arguing, he invited the 
Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in Valente in light of its decision in 
the Provincial Court Judges Reference. Although the Supreme Court in Valente 
had held that subsection 11(d) of the Charter does not require an address of the 
legislature, Therrien argued that subsection 11(d) is only relevant in a criminal 
                                                                                                                                                              
30
  R.S.Q., c. T-16. 
31
  Supra, note 3, at 20. 
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law context and that in a non-criminal law context, it is not subsection 11(d) but 
the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 that should apply. In his view, the 
preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 should provide the same protection to 
provincial court judges that section 99 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides to 
superior court judges, namely an address of the legislature prior to removal.  
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed Therrien’s constitutional challenge. 
The Supreme Court reviewed the requirements for security of tenure outlined in 
Valente in the context of subsection 11(d) of the Charter: that a judge may only 
be removed for cause after a judicial inquiry at which the judge is given an 
opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court also reviewed the holding in 
Valente that subsection 11(d) of the Charter does not require an address of the 
legislature prior to the removal of provincial court judges. The Supreme Court 
found that the Provincial Court Judges Reference had not undermined the 
conclusions reached in Valente, but had rather reinforced and affirmed those 
conclusions. In so finding, the Supreme Court confined the Provincial Court 
Judges Reference to the financial security of provincial court judges:  
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court, supra, raised the 
specific question of whether the guarantee of judicial independence, and primarily 
the financial security aspect, restricted the manner by and extent to which the gov-
ernment and provincial legislatures can reduce salaries of provincial court judges. 
A majority of the Court found that for purposes of s. 11(d) of the Canadian Char-
ter, judges’ salaries may be reduced, increased or frozen provided that the govern-
ment refers consideration of the proposed measure to an independent commission.32  
The Supreme Court concluded that an address of the legislature is not a nec-
essary constitutional requirement for the security of tenure of provincial court 
judges. 
The Supreme Court also found that the Court of Appeal’s recommendation 
that Judge Therrien be removed was the appropriate sanction in the case. The 
Court held that the integrity of the judiciary and public confidence in the judici-
ary prevailed over Judge  
Therrien’s individual interests: 
The public’s invaluable confidence in its justice system, which every judge must 
strive to preserve, is at the very heart of this case. The issue of confidence governs 
every aspect of this case, and ultimately dictates the result.  
… 
… I am not unaware that this case represented, in a sense, an invitation to society to 
be ever more generous. The pardon that the appellant was granted is an act of gen-
                                                                                                                                                              
32
  Id., at 51. 
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erosity, of brotherhood, but also an act of justice on the part of society. It is un-
doubtedly desirable that such gestures be praised and encouraged. However, we 
cannot ignore the unique role embodied by the judge in that society, and the ex-
traordinary vulnerability of the individuals who appear before that judge seeking to 
have their rights determined, or when their lives or liberty are at stake. Above all, a 
person who appears before a judge is entitled to have justice done in his or her case, 
and that justice be seen to be done by the general public. That kind of generosity is 
not something that a person can be compelled to offer. In the specific circumstances 
of the case at bar, the values of forgiveness and selfless generosity must therefore 
yield to the values of justice and the all-important integrity of the justice system.33 
2. Ocean Port 
Ocean Port involved a challenge to the institutional independence of mem-
bers of the Liquor Appeal Board (the “Board”) under the  
Liquor Control and Licensing Act34 (the “Act”). A senior inspector concluded 
that Ocean Port Hotel had violated the Act and imposed a two-day suspension 
of its liquor licence. Ocean Port appealed to the Board by way of a hearing de 
novo. Board members are appointed for a fixed term of one year, are paid per 
diem, and serve on a part-time basis and “at the pleasure of the Lieutenant 
Governor in Council.”35 After hearing Ocean Port’s appeal, the Board con-
firmed the two-day suspension of Ocean Port’s liquor licence.  
The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed Ocean Port’s appeal.36 The 
Court held that the ultimate decision to suspend a liquor licence because of a 
violation of the Act “closely resembles a judicial decision”37 and that the finan-
cial consequences of the suspension could exceed the maximum fine that the 
Provincial Court could impose for the same violation. Accordingly, the Court 
held that the content of the rules of procedural fairness “must approach those 
required of a court at common law.”38 
The Court of Appeal held that the Board lacked the security of tenure re-
quired to ensure its institutional independence. In the Court’s view, the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s decision in Régie determined the outcome of the 
appeal. Although Régie was concerned with section 23 of the Quebec Charter, 
the Court of Appeal held that Gonthier J. had looked to the common law rules 
                                                                                                                                                              
33
  Id., at 96, 98 (emphasis in original). 
34
  R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 237 [now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 267]. 
35
  Id., s. 30(2)(a).  
36
  (1999), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 498 (B.C. C.A.). 
37
  Id., at 503-4. 
38
  Id., at 504. 
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of natural justice in determining the appropriate scope of tribunal independ-
ence. The Court of Appeal further held: 
Included in [Régie] was this sentence. “Fixed-term appointments, which are com-
mon, are acceptable. However, the removal of adjudicators must not simply be at 
the pleasure of the executive.” That expression of opinion was part of a considered 
judgment on the very point in issue before us having regard to a regime controlling 
the same industry. The adjudicative tasks at issue were similar. 
... 
… [T]he Supreme Court of Canada has decided that appointments at pleasure to 
administrative agencies such as the Quebec Régie d’alcool and the Liquor Appeal 
Board exercising the power to impose sanctions for violations of statutes compara-
ble to that possessed by courts of law are not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of 
security of tenure and that for such agencies security of tenure is an essential re-
quirement of independence. I cannot distinguish a fixed term appointment on a 
part-time basis from a full-time appointment at pleasure in its effect on the office 
holder as it would be regarded by a well informed and right minded observer.39  
The Court of Appeal concluded that since the Board was not sufficiently in-
dependent, the Board’s decision must be set aside. Since counsel for the Board 
had conceded that the validity of the senior inspector’s decision to suspend 
Ocean Port’s liquor licence depended upon a fair hearing before the Board, the 
Court held that the senior inspector’s decision must also be set aside. 
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeal. Writing for the Court, McLachlin C.J. held that the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal had erred in disregarding a fundamental principle: 
that in the absence of a constitutional challenge, “a statutory regime prevails 
over common law principles of natural justice.”40 The Supreme Court held:  
It is well-established that, absent constitutional constraints, the degree of independ-
ence required of a particular government decision-maker or tribunal is determined 
by its enabling statute. It is the legislature or Parliament that determines the degree 
of independence required of tribunal members. The statute must be construed as a 
whole to determine the degree of independence the legislature intended.  
… 
… [L]ike all principles of natural justice, the degree of independence required of 
tribunal members may be ousted by express statutory language or necessary impli-
cation. … Ultimately, it is Parliament or the legislature that determines the nature 
of a tribunal’s relationship to the executive. It is not open to a court to apply a 
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common law rule in the face of clear statutory direction. Courts engaged in judicial 
review of administrative decisions must defer to the legislator’s intention in assess-
ing the degree of independence required of the tribunal in question.41  
The Supreme Court further held that there is a “fundamental  
distinction” between courts and administrative tribunals.42 While courts are 
constitutionally required to be independent, administrative tribunals do not, as a 
general rule, attract the constitutional requirements of the Charter: 
Superior courts, by virtue of their role as courts of inherent jurisdiction, are consti-
tutionally required to possess objective guarantees of both individual and institu-
tional independence. The same constitutional imperative applies to the provincial 
courts: Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Ed-
ward Island … Historically, the requirement of judicial independence developed to 
demarcate the fundamental division between the judiciary and the executive. It pro-
tected, and continues to protect, the impartiality of judges — both in fact and per-
ception — by insulating them from external influence, most notably the influence 
of the executive …  
Administrative tribunals, by contrast, lack this constitutional distinction from the 
executive. They are, in fact, created precisely for the purpose of implementing gov-
ernment policy. Implementation of that policy may require them to make quasi-
judicial decisions. They thus may be seen as spanning the constitutional divide be-
tween the executive and judicial branches of government. However, given their 
primary policy-making function, it is properly the role and responsibility of Parlia-
ment and the legislatures to determine the composition and structure required by a 
tribunal to discharge the responsibilities bestowed upon it. While tribunals may 
sometimes attract Charter requirements of independence, as a general rule they do 
not.43  
The Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional guarantee of inde-
pendence implicated in the case, since Ocean Port had not challenged the 
Board’s independence under subsection 11(d) or section 7 of the Charter. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the unwritten constitutional principle of 
judicial independence articulated in the Provincial Court Judges Reference had 
no application to administrative tribunals: 
The language and reasoning of the [Provincial Court Judges Reference] are con-
fined to the superior and provincial courts. Lamer C.J. addressed the issue of judi-
cial independence; that is, the independence of the courts of law comprising the 
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judicial branch of government. Nowhere in his reasons does he extend his com-
ments to tribunals other than courts of law.  
Nor does the rationale for locating a constitutional guarantee of independence in the 
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, extend, as a matter of principle, to adminis-
trative tribunals.  
… 
Lamer C.J. … supported his conclusion with reference to the traditional division 
between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The preservation of this 
tripartite constitutional structure, he argued, requires a constitutional guarantee of 
an independent judiciary. The classical division between court and state does not, 
however, compel the same conclusion in relation to the independence of adminis-
trative tribunals. As discussed, such tribunals span the constitutional divide be-
tween the judiciary and the executive. While they may possess adjudicative 
functions, they ultimately operate as part of the executive branch of government, 
under the mandate of the legislature. They are not courts, and do not occupy the 
same constitutional role as courts.44 [Emphasis in original] 
The Supreme Court found that the legislative intention that members of the 
Board should serve at pleasure was unequivocal. Accordingly, the Act left “no 
room to import common law doctrines of independence.”45 The Supreme Court 
remitted the case to the British Columbia Court of Appeal to determine the 
issues it had not addressed.  
III.  THE FUTURE DEBATES 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Therrien and Ocean Port raise 
several issues for future debate. With respect to judicial independence, is the 
application of the unwritten constitutional principle limited to the financial 
security of provincial court judges? With respect to tribunal independence, does 
the holding that legislation can override the common law principle of natural 
justice apply to the elements of financial security and administrative control 
over proceedings just as it does to the element of security of tenure?46 If so, 
what is required of the legislature to override these elements of tribunal inde-
pendence?47 Is it only legislation that can override the common law principle of 
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natural justice or can subordinate legislation or orders-in-council also override 
the principle?48 Where a quasi-constitutional statute protects tribunal independ-
ence, would the sort of part-time, limited-term, at-pleasure appointments at 
issue in Ocean Port satisfy tribunal independence?49 And to what extent will it 
be possible to maintain the Supreme Court of Canada’s distinction between 
tribunal independence and judicial independence?  
The most challenging of these issues is the extent to which it will be possible 
to maintain the Supreme Court of Canada’s distinction between tribunal inde-
pendence and judicial independence. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in Ocean Port almost entirely limits the doctrine of tribunal independence to 
the common law principle of natural justice, which is itself subject to legislative  
derogation. Because the Supreme Court held in Ocean Port that the unwritten 
constitutional principle does not apply to administrative tribunals and that 
administrative tribunals do not generally attract the constitutional requirements 
of the Charter, the doctrine of tribunal independence will be far more limited 
than the doctrine of judicial independence.  
In his review of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ocean Port, 
David Jones questions the distinction between tribunal independence and judi-
cial independence:  
Is there really a bright-line distinction between “courts” (including inferior courts 
like the provincial courts exercising both criminal and civil jurisdiction) and “ad-
ministrative agencies” — especially those exercising quasi-judicial functions? 
What is it that makes a “court” a “court”? What are the limitations on the ability of 
the legislative branch to allocate adjudicative functions to administrative agencies 
rather than to the “courts”?50 
However, Katrina Wyman suggests that the distinction between tribunal in-
dependence and judicial independence is justified on two grounds: the distinct 
dispute-resolution process of administrative tribunals, and the limited constitu-
tional role of administrative tribunals.51 She argues that these distinctive fea-
tures militate against extending to administrative tribunals the unwritten 
constitutional principle of judicial independence articulated in the Provincial 
Court Judges Reference.  
With respect to the first ground, the dispute-resolution process of administra-
tive tribunals is generally more specialized, flexible, efficient, inexpensive and 
informal than the dispute-resolution process of courts. In Douglas/Kwantlen 
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Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College,52 La Forest J. held that the “raison d’etre” of 
administrative tribunals is specialization, simple rules of evidence and proce-
dure, and speedy decisions.53 In Wyman’s view, extending to administrative 
tribunals the unwritten constitutional principle of judicial independence would 
undermine the ability of governments to create tribunals with this distinct dis-
pute-resolution process.54 For example, the part-time, limited-term, at-pleasure 
appointments at issue in Ocean Port are common types of appointments to 
administrative tribunals.55 These appointments have several advantages, includ-
ing diversity of membership, the ability to attract participation, increased effi-
ciency and decreased cost.56 If the Supreme Court in Ocean Port had held that 
such appointments fail to meet tribunal independence, governments would have 
been required to restructure myriad administrative tribunals and the advantages 
of these types of appointments would have been lost. 
With respect to the second ground, only a small number of tribunals deter-
mine rights and freedoms under the Charter and constitutional issues arise less 
frequently before tribunals. Further, the decisions of tribunals on constitutional 
issues are not entitled to curial deference and tribunals are restricted in their 
remedial powers under section 52 of the Charter.57 By contrast, courts have 
always had a significant constitutional role and their role has become even 
more significant since the enactment of the Charter. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has relied largely upon the constitutional role of courts in developing 
the doctrine of judicial independence. For instance, in Beauregard, the Court 
held that “[t]he role of the courts as resolver of disputes, interpreter of the law 
and defender of the Constitution requires that they be completely separate in 
authority and function from all other participants in the justice system” [empha-
sis in original].58 Similarly, in the Provincial Court Judges Reference, the Court 
held that “in order to guarantee that the courts can protect the Constitution, they 
must be protected by a set of objective guarantees against intrusions by the 
executive and the legislative branches of government.”59 If the constitutional 
role of the courts warrants greater protection for judicial independence, the 
primarily non-constitutional role of administrative tribunals must warrant less 
protection for tribunal independence.  
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Together, the two grounds for the distinction between tribunal independence 
and judicial independence suggested by Wyman — the distinct dispute-
resolution process of tribunals and the limited constitutional role of tribunals — 
may justify a lower level of protection for tribunal independence in many cases. 
However, they may not justify a lower level of protection in all cases. Some 
administrative tribunals closely resemble courts in both form and function: 
some tribunals have dispute-resolution processes similar to those of courts and, 
perhaps more importantly, some tribunals do determine rights and freedoms 
under the Charter.60 For such tribunals, there is little justification for a doctrine 
of tribunal independence that is far more limited than the doctrine of judicial 
independence.  
In Ocean Port, the Supreme Court of Canada held that administrative tribu-
nals do not “as a general rule”61 attract Charter requirements of independence, 
but that tribunals “may sometimes”62 attract these requirements. The Supreme 
Court did not explain the basis for this holding, nor did it explain precisely 
when tribunals might attract Charter requirements of independence. However, 
at the very least, the language of Ocean Port suggests that the distinction be-
tween judicial independence and tribunal independence may be open to further 
consideration and development and that the doctrine of tribunal independence 
may be open to further expansion. For administrative tribunals that closely 
resemble courts, this possibility is promising. If future courts respond to this 
possibility, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ocean Port may come 
to represent a low-water mark in the development of the doctrine of tribunal 
independence, just as the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the Provincial 
Court Judges Reference represents a high-water mark in the development of the 
doctrine of judicial independence. 
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